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Abstract:  Fission explosions produce large numbers of antineutrinos.  It is occasionally 
asked whether this distinctive, unshieldable emission could help reveal clandestine nuclear 
weapon explosions. The practical challenge encountered is that detectors large enough for 
this application are cost prohibitive, likely on the multi-billion-dollar scale. In this paper, 
we review several hypothetical use cases for antineutrino detectors as supplements to the 
seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and airborne radionuclide sensors of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s International Monitoring System. 
In each case, if an anti-neutrino detector could be constructed that would compete with 
existing capabilities, we conclude that the cost would considerably outstrip the value it 
might add to the existing monitoring network, compared to the significantly lower costs 
for the same or superior capability. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a network of detectors (seismic, 
hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide (particulate and noble gas) throughout the 
world for the purpose of verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Within the CTBT framework, all nuclear explosion testing is banned, regardless 
of the location or size of the nuclear explosive test. Waveform technologies (seismic, 
hydroacoustic, and infrasound) observe a signal that transports at the speed of sound. 
Airborne radionuclide signals can be observed on a much longer time scale. Observable 
airborne radionuclide signals may be delayed both due to the subsurface gas migration and 
atmospheric transport but can be a clear sign of a nuclear explosion (with the ability to 
confirm the nuclear nature of an explosion). These measurement techniques currently form 
the technical basis for world-wide monitoring under the CTBT’s verification regime. 
 
The combination of these detector technologies offers potential to both estimate the 
magnitude of events, with a goal of verifying whether a suspicious event is nuclear in 
nature. Yet, even with the complementary abilities of these technologies, there are 
scenarios where the detection mechanisms may not yet achieve the desired level of 
sensitivity achieved by the current IMS. In such situations, it might be advantageous to 
have a complementary detection technology capable of filling in the measurement gaps or 
otherwise augment existing IMS detection capabilities. This complementary technology 
could provide a redundant detection capability for an improved confidence of detection. 
That motivates the search for new and compelling methods for detection of nuclear 
explosions. 
 
Since at least the 1950s, physicists have recognized that fission explosions produce intense 
bursts of antineutrinos primarily from the secondary beta-decay of fission products that 
occur within seconds of the primary fission event. The scientists who made the first-ever 
antineutrino detection considered using a nuclear weapon test as the source (Reines, 1996). 
They would have needed to place their cubic-meter-scale detector within a kilometer of the 
explosion, due to antineutrino’s very weak interaction cross-section. In a kiloton nuclear 
explosion, the initial fissions produce a variety of fission products resulting in many 
antineutrinos emitted during the life of those fission products. Of the 1024 antineutrinos 
emitted from a kiloton explosion, only a few would have registered in the group’s detector, 
even at a distance of just a few hundred meters. The group found it more practical to deploy 
their detector outside a nuclear reactor.  
 
Nonetheless, as scientists have built ever-larger neutrino and antineutrino detectors for 
basic science, the idea of detecting antineutrinos from fission explosions has drawn 
attention again. After the negotiation of the CTBT, a group at Sandia National Laboratory 
studied whether antineutrino detectors could play a useful role in verifying the ban. Their 
study concluded that, “while antineutrino detectors are in theory very attractive for CTBT 
verification, both engineering difficulties and physics limitations severely limit the actual 
application of the technology for this purpose” (Bernstein et al., 2001). A more recent 
study, considering the combination of antineutrino detectors and seismic sensors, came to 
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the same conclusion (Carr et al., 2018). The large size and cost of detectors, as demanded 
by the low antineutrino interaction probability, are the essential constraints. There was 
previously a study looking at the cost of a large antineutrino detector network (Guillian, 
2006), which found the total cost to be trillions of dollars with the detector technologies at 
the time. 
 
While nuclear reactors and nuclear explosions both produce antineutrinos, this paper does 
not focus on the application of antineutrino detectors for nuclear reactor monitoring. 
Nevertheless, much of the antineutrino detection technology developed within the last two 
decades for reactor antineutrino monitoring (Bernstein et al., 2010; Bernstein et al., 2001) 
is relevant as a technology basis for evaluation.   
 
In the following sections, we describe the basic physics behind these studies, and we extend 
their analyses by giving explicit cost estimates for the antineutrino detectors in three 
hypothetical use cases: 1) augment the global monitoring network: both confirming the 
nuclear nature of an explosion observed by seismic sensors and detecting an unobserved 
nuclear explosion; 2) a co-operative test site transparency scenario; and 3) providing 
additional information beyond explosion detection.  
 
 
II.  Physics of Detecting Antineutrinos from a Fission Explosion 
 
A. Antineutrino signal from a fission explosion 
 
Antineutrinos are emitted in large quantities from operating nuclear power reactor cores 
over an extended duration. A nuclear explosion is a rather similar process over a very short 
time scale (and with less fissile material), resulting in antineutrinos being primarily emitted 
in a much shorter duration. Thus, a burst of antineutrinos would be a distinct signature of 
an explosive nuclear event. As antineutrinos are very penetrating (due to their low 
interaction cross section), they are virtually impossible to shield against and may allow for 
sensitive detectors to make a measurement at some distance. After a fission occurs, the 
fission fragments undergo a series of beta decays, resulting in five to six antineutrinos per 
fission that occurs. 
 
For 1-kiloton (kT) nuclear explosions (based on a nuclear explosion detection threshold of 
~0.2–0.5 kT (National Academy of Sciences, 2002) – Section III), approximately 1024 
antineutrinos are emitted from the subsequent beta decays. The energy of the emitted 
antineutrinos ranges from approximately 0 to 10 MeV, with a larger fraction emitted at the 
lower energies. Of these approximately 30% (2.6 x 1023 antineutrinos) are emitted in a 10 
second window. The other 70% are spread out much later in time and not well time-
correlated to the initial fission. For comparison, a 3-GWth nuclear reactor produces 
approximately 6 × 1021 antineutrinos every 10 seconds. The antineutrino flux available for 
measurement from both of these sources is reduced by the requirement that the energy be 
above 1.802 MeV for the inverse beta decay reaction (?̅? + 𝑝 → 𝑛 + 𝑒!), which is the most 
prevalent and demonstrated mechanism for measuring reactor antineutrinos. Thus, for a 
nuclear explosion, the 30% emitted within 10 seconds is reduced by approximately 30% 
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for a total source of detectable antineutrinos (above the 1.802 MeV threshold) of 
approximately 10% the total (7.25 x 1022). The flux available at the detector will decrease 
as the distance between the nuclear explosion and the detector increases. We will 
investigate the detector size requirements with three subsequent use cases and stand-off-
distances. 
 
B.  Detection approach 
 
Due to the ability of neutrinos (and antineutrinos) to travel long distances without 
interacting, very large detectors are required for antineutrino detection. One such detector 
is the Super Kamiokande (neutrino) detector (Super-K), Figure 1, which consists of 50,000 
tons of water. Kamiokande, the predecessor of Super-K, was one of the detectors to observe 
a time-correlated cluster of neutrinos from Supernova 1987a, that took place approximately 
168,000 light-years from Earth (Antonioli, 2004; Hirata, 1987). The correlation of events 
that are clustered in time can also be extended to the case of a burst of antineutrinos 
resulting from a nuclear explosion with the same time scale. While Super Kamiokande was 
built in 1996, Hyper Kamiokande (Hyper-K), with a 260,000-ton water target, is the largest 
currently proposed antineutrino detector at a cost of ~$1B.  
 
 
Figure 1. Left) Model of the Super Kamiokande detector (Kajita, 2016), demonstrating the size of 
current neutrino/antineutrino detectors. The total cost of this detector was 
approximately 100 million dollars. Right) Model of the next generation detector, 
Hyper Kamiokande (Lodovico, 2017; Hyper-K 2018), expected to cost approximately 
1 billion dollars. 
 
More recently, antineutrino detectors have been used to probe the properties of the 
neutrino/antineutrinos through detection of antineutrinos emitted from a nuclear reactor at 
distances up to 1 km away (Daya Bay, 2012; Double Chooz, 2012; Reno, 2012). There 
have also been efforts proposed at monitoring a nuclear reactor at a farther distance (25 
km) with a Gadolinium-Doped Water-Cherenkov detector (Askins, 2015). Another smaller 
antineutrino detector (1 tonne) has previously been placed at the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station (25 m from the reactor core) to track the antineutrino rate and monitor 
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the amount of uranium and plutonium within the reactor (Bowden et al., 2009). There are 
now also efforts at monitoring smaller reactors with surface detectors (Ashenfelter, 2018; 
Huber, 2019) 
 
The simplest detection mechanism for antineutrinos from fission is inverse beta decay. An 
antineutrino with a minimum energy of 1.802 MeV interacts with a proton creating a 
positron and neutron. The neutron can subsequently be detected via neutron capture, which 
is often aided by doping the water with gadolinium. The use of gadolinium decreases the 
neutron capture time and allows for particle identification to be performed based on the 
observation of the positron and neutron signals in coincidence (Kim, 2016). One may 
explore the option of using alternative detection mechanisms (such as neutrino-electron 
elastic scattering or  coherent elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering) to detect the antineutrinos 
(Hagmann & Bernstein, 2004; Scholberg, 2015), but these other detection mechanisms do 
not offer the signal detection (Sangiorgio et al., 2013) or discrimination (antineutrino 
events and background) capabilities required for nuclear explosion monitoring (Foxe et al., 
2015).  
 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that inverse beta decay is used as the detection 
mechanism, which means neutrino backgrounds are not an issue. For this reason, we focus 
solely on backgrounds that have the potential to mimic antineutrino signals in an inverse 
beta-decay based detector for nuclear explosion monitoring.  
 
C.  Backgrounds to detection 
 
In order to successfully detect antineutrinos from a nuclear explosion, it is important to 
measure the background sufficiently well to characterize it. These backgrounds consist of: 
1) terrestrial antineutrinos, 2) anthropogenic antineutrinos (nuclear reactor antineutrinos), 
and 3) false antineutrino events (accidental coincidences or other neutron generating 
primary interactions such as cosmic ray interactions). While accounting for these 
backgrounds may be difficult, the best remedy is to attempt to reduce the impact of the 
backgrounds as much as possible. We will assume a best-case scenario for the antineutrino 
detector: All other potential backgrounds such as noise, instrumental imperfections are 
eliminated (somehow) resulting in zero extraneous backgrounds. 
 
False Antineutrino Event Backgrounds: 
 
Due to the scarcity of detection of antineutrinos, it is important to have sufficient shielding 
to reduce environmental backgrounds that may mask the antineutrino signal. Such 
backgrounds include muons and fast neutrons. Since inverse beta decay works on the 
principle of the detection of the positron followed by the detection of the neutron capture, 
it is possible for other events (such as fast neutrons) to mimic this behavior. It may be 
possible to use event location in small detectors to distinguish events from a muon or fast 
neutron from that of an antineutrino (Sweany et al., 2015). The primary way to reduce the 
false antineutrino backgrounds is through additional shielding of muons and fast neutrons. 
The muons and fast neutrons are the results of the cosmic rays that bombard the earth. The 
best way to reduce the number of muons and fast neutrons is with a large overburden (Mei 
	 6	
and Hime, 2006), a feat often performed by deploying a detector deep underground (such 
as SNOLAB or Gran Sasso (Jillings, 2009)). In these situations, thicker/denser rock 
between the detector and the surface is preferred as it will better attenuate the muons and 
fast neutrons from the surface. 
 
While there have been instances when an antineutrino detector has been deployed with 
little or no overburden, these instances have been close to a nuclear reactor (25 meters 
away) (Bowden et al., 2009; Haghighat et al., 2018). The increased antineutrino flux near 
the reactor was able to overcome the background of ~100 false antineutrino events per day 
(Bowden et al., 2009), but the false antineutrino rate of ~100 events is much higher than 
the real antineutrino rate from a distant nuclear explosion. 
 
Antineutrino Backgrounds: 
 
Antineutrino backgrounds must be handled separately from the other backgrounds that can 
be reduced through shielding. Antineutrinos occur naturally due to the radioactive decay 
of various materials within the earth (i.e. uranium and thorium decay chains). While the 
Earth’s crust provides a stable source of antineutrinos, the magnitude varies based on the 
surrounding geology and geophysics of the location, with the average antineutrino flux 
being approximately 108.6 antineutrinos/100 cm2/s. These antineutrinos are produced from 
various sources, with different energy ranges (e.g. uranium and thorium decay chains 
versus the decay of potassium-40). Accounting for the geophysics for a detector location 
is important to be able to accurately determine the antineutrino background rates. This is a 
significant source of background when dealing with a detector large enough to observe a 
nuclear explosion, and the specific detector location would need to avoid any antineutrino 
hot spots.  
 
Reactor antineutrinos are also an irreducible background, emitted in large quantities from 
nuclear power reactors. A 1-GW electric nuclear reactor emits ~1021 antineutrinos per 
second, or 1022 antineutrinos over the 10-second nuclear explosion burst period. As the rate 
of neutrino emission from a 1-kT nuclear explosion (1024) is on the order of a potential 
source from a close nuclear reactor, the impact of current and future nuclear reactors must 
be considered when choosing detector locations. 
 
Fortunately for the present study, the combination of all antineutrino backgrounds has been 
summarized in previous work (Usman, 2015). This prior work looked at the global 
antineutrino rates as a function of energy and geographic location.  
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Figure 2: 2015 survey of all antineutrinos around the world. Approximately 1.6% of the antineutrinos on this map are 
above 1.8 MeV, with hot spots near nuclear reactors. (Usman, 2015). Flux units are antineutrinos/100 cm2/s at the 
Earth’s surface. Map includes antineutrinos of all energies. 
 
The study calculated the number of antineutrinos globally based on the sources coming 
from nuclear reactors and geoneutrinos from the earth’s crust (uranium, thorium, and 
potassium). In the 2015 survey, it was shown that antineutrinos above 1.8 MeV accounted 
for just 1.6% of the total antineutrino luminosity. Based on this map, the global antineutrino 
background above the IBD threshold of 1.802 MeV is approximately 105 
antineutrinos/cm2/s. This background number is good to keep in mind as it would serve as 
a detection limit for a land-based antineutrino detector. In order to limit this background 
and provide flexibility in detector locations, an antineutrino detector deployed in the ocean 
is a likely scenario. 
 
 
III.  Hypothetical Uses for Antineutrino Detectors in Explosion Monitoring 
 
Minimum detector size is a parameter that is directly influenced by the antineutrino 
interaction cross section. Since the antineutrino interaction cross section is very small (~10-
44 cm2), a detector designed to detect antineutrinos from a source such as a nuclear 
explosion must include a large number of potential interaction sites for the antineutrino. 
Additionally, the size further increases as the distance to a nuclear explosion increases and 
the size of the nuclear explosion decreases.  
 
Based on current nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities, a detection threshold of a 
nuclear yield of ~0.2–0.5 kT is established (National Academy of Sciences, 2002). For ease 
of comparison, we choose a 1-kT nuclear explosion as an antineutrino source. Using the 
source of antineutrinos from a 1-kT nuclear explosion of 7.25×1022 as calculated in the 
prior section, we will investigate the size and cost requirements with three subsequent use 
cases. 
 
Use Case #1: Support of a Global Monitoring Network 
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One way antineutrino detectors could, in principle, supplement the existing IMS is by 
confirming the nuclear nature of an event picked up by seismic sensors. While seismic 
waveforms can provide information about the location and yield of a suspected nuclear 
explosion, they can only indirectly indicate that the event was nuclear in nature. Currently, 
the IMS uses radionuclide (particulate and noble gas) sensors to seek explicit confirmation 
that a suspect event involved nuclear fission. Radionuclides are not always released from 
underground nuclear explosions, and transport to sensor stations is not guaranteed. 
Antineutrinos are theoretically an attractive alternative to confirm the nuclear nature of an 
explosion. 
 
Use Case #1a: Confirming the nuclear nature: seismically cued 
 
A recent study explored the possibility of using antineutrino detectors to confirm the 
nuclear nature of suspect seismic events (Carr et al., 2018). The idea is to use the time of 
detonation inferred from the seismic waveforms as an analysis trigger, or “cue,” for an 
antineutrino detector. One would look for an antineutrino signal in a short window 
following the seismic cue, probably about a 10-second long window. This window is 
determined by the beta decay following the fission and would be largely distance 
independent. As long as the background rate is sufficiently low, an antineutrino signal in 
that window would be a statistically credible indicator that the suspect seismic event 
involved nuclear fission. The study quantified the size of water-based antineutrino 
detectors that could confirm the nuclear nature of an explosion with a given yield, from a 
given standoff. While other detector materials such as liquid scintillator are possible for 
antineutrino detection from sources with little stand-off (e.g. a nuclear reactor), Water-
Cherenkov detectors are the focus of this study due to the large masses required for nuclear 
explosion sources and large stand-offs. Results, derived from a detailed signal simulation 
and realistic background estimates, appear in Figure 3.  
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Even if we consider a scenario comparable to more recent nuclear tests of high-yield fission 
explosions, very large antineutrino detectors would be needed to confirm the nuclear 
nature, even from modest distances. As a baseline for a larger yield scenario, we consider 
a DPRK nuclear test with fission yield of 20 kT based on the 2016 DPRK tests (Pasyanos, 
2018) and a 2.6 MTonne detector costing $5B (10 times the size of Hyper K (Hyper-
Kamiokande, 2018) and 50 times the size of Super K) located at a distance of 500 km, 
roughly half way between Japan and North Korea (deployed sufficiently deep, such that 
the water shielding is enough to reduce the background from false-antineutrino events). 
Based on this scenario, we calculate that 4.6 events (on par with the level of events required 
to distinguish the antineutrino signals from background) would have been observed from 
the nuclear test in a 2.6 MTonne detector. 
 
However, it is notable that nuclear testing at the 20-kT level would produce large seismic 
signals at 100 km and if radionuclides are released, large concentrations of radionuclides. 
An improvement to the global monitoring network at a distance of 100 km would require 
a very dense grid of antineutrino detectors compared to the approximate 1000-km grid size 
used in the IMS. Costs for such a system could exceed $1000B. Such an investment in 
infrastructure should rightfully be compared to the improvement that could be achieved by 
increasing the current radionuclide detection systems, the current means used to confirm 
Figure	3:	Mass	of	a	water-based	neutrino	detector	that	could	give	90%	probability	of	
confirming	fission	yield	for	a	suspect	seismic	event	at	99%	confidence	level,	for	various	true	
yields	(blue	curves).	The	step	discontinuities	come	from	the	small	number	of	discrete	events	
required	when	backgrounds	are	low.	The	smooth	waves	come	from	neutrino	flavor	oscillations.	
The	horizontal	lines	indicate	the	sizes	of	three	planned	or	existing	neutrino	detectors:	Hyper-
Kamiokande	(a	very	large	detector	planned	for	Japan),	Super-Kamiokande	(the	largest	existing	
liquid	water-based	neutrino	detector,	in	Japan),	and	WATCHMAN	(a	detector	planned	for	a	
nuclear	reactor	monitoring	demonstration	in	the	UK).	Details	of	this	figure	appear	in	Carr	et	
al.,	2018.	
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the nuclear nature of an explosive event, using the same amount of resources. 
Approximately 106 radionuclide detection systems could be purchased for the equivalent 
cost. At this scale of investment, one current generation radionuclide sensor could be 
placed per 100 km2, noting Manhattan Island is approximately 60 km2 in area. This density 
is much smaller than the localization utilized by the CTBTO, which has a maximum 
inspection area under the CTBTO On-Site Inspection regime of 1000 km2. For further 
comparison, the current IMS radionuclide sensor density is approximately one sensor per 
100,000 km2.  At a density of sensitive radionuclide systems of 1000 times the current 
density, detection thresholds using radionuclide systems alone could prove sufficient for 
detection, considering such an array would have a sensor on average within 10 km from 
the test site.  
 
Use Case #1b: Augmenting a Global Monitoring Network 
 
If we require that the network of detectors be on par with current IMS nuclear explosion 
monitoring capabilities (National Academy of Sciences, 2002), we can assess the scenario 
of a ~1 kT explosion that is detonated at an unknown location throughout the world and is 
not detected by the current IMS. In this scenario, a monitoring distance can be obtained 
from the radionuclide spacing in the IMS. The spacing between radionuclide stations is 
approximately 2000 km, so we use a monitoring distance of 1000 km. We calculate the 
antineutrino flux at the detector based on a source of antineutrinos above the inverse beta 
decay from a nuclear explosion (7.25×1022 antineutrinos/1 kT): 
 
 
Equation	1:	Calculation	of	the	antineutrino	(?̅?)	flux	at	the	detector	for	global	monitoring	
Antineutrino	Flux	at	Detector	=	 Antineutrino	(?̅?)	Source(Distance	from	explosion)! = 7.25	 ×	10!!	?̅?(1000	km)! = 	7250000	 ?̅?𝑐𝑚! 
 
For inverse beta decay, once above the threshold of 1.802, the average cross section of 
interaction is approximately 10-44 cm2 (with the energy averaged cross section of 5.92 ± 
0.14 × 10-43 cm2/fission from a reactor). Using the interaction cross section above the 
threshold and the density of the detector material (water), we calculate the number of 
antineutrino events per gram of detector mass: 
 
Equation	2:	Calculation	of	the	antineutrino	interaction	rate	within	the	detector	medium	(water)	based	on	the	number	
of	protons	per	gram	of	water.	Antineutrino	interaction	rate	=	7250000	 ?̅?𝑐𝑚! 	 ∙ 	10"##	cm! ∙ 3.3 × 10!$ 1g = 2.4 × 10"%# ?̅?	eventsg  
 
 
Based on the background rates for an antineutrino detector, it is suggested that a burst of 5 
events is required to statistically correlate the antineutrinos to the same source (Bernstein, 
2001). The detector size is then calculated as: 
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Equation	3:	Calculation	of	the	required	antineutrino	detector	size	for	the	required	event	burst	observed	within	the	
detector	for	a	global	monitoring	network.	
Detector	size	=	 Event	burst	size?̅?	interaction	rate = 5	events2.4 × 10!"# ?̅?	eventsg = 2.06 × 10"#g = 200	MTonnes = 200,000,000	𝑚$ 
 
 
At a detector size of 200 MTonnes, this would be the equivalent of 200 Empire State 
Building size detectors. Based on previous large-scale antineutrino detectors, a cost of 
~$100M for a 50 kTonne is assumed, meaning that a single antineutrino detector for the 
global monitoring of nuclear explosions would cost ~$400B. At a value of $400B apiece, 
the cost would be 400 times the cost of the entire 1-billion-dollar IMS network. An 
extremely well contained underground explosion might still be below the detection limits 
of a higher density IMS, but the overall cost-to-benefit ratio seems much more favorable 
than for an antineutrino detector network. 
 
Recall that both radionuclide and antineutrino detectors could be used to verify if an 
explosion was nuclear in nature. While the IMS has both particulate and radioxenon 
radionuclide detectors, the focus here is on the radioxenon as it is more likely to be released 
from an underground nuclear test. There are currently 40 locations for radioxenon 
detectors, with the potential for this value to be increased to 80 sensors, greatly increasing 
the sensitivity for determining if an explosion was nuclear in nature. As a price comparison, 
we look at the cost of the radioxenon detection systems. It is known that the radioxenon 
detectors cost ~$1M per system, so it would cost approximately $40M to double the density 
of radioxenon detectors throughout the network.  
 
Due to the complexity and extent of the infrastructure required for an antineutrino detector 
compared to that of the rest of the IMS, one could expect that State parties to the CTBT 
may be more hesitant to allow an antineutrino detector in their country compared to the 
IMS stations. From this, it is clear that the locations of land-based antineutrino detectors 
would likely be limited, and an alternative of water-based locations would need to be 
investigated (Cicenas, 2011).  The water-based locations would put a larger distance 
between the detector and the closest crustal source of background antineutrinos. However, 
the same requirements on size and detector depth would need to be followed for a water-
based location, with the detector construction (vessel) and detection medium still being the 
same as on land.  Therefore, water-borne locations may expand the list of potential 
locations, but it doesn’t solve the issues of distance from the antineutrino source (nuclear 
explosion) for mid-continent nuclear test sites or the cost associated with developing and 
deploying such a detector.  
 
Meeting this scenario would require that the detectors be spaced approximately 2000 km 
apart on the coast. It should be noted, that there are scenarios where the detector will be 
farther than 1000 km from a potential explosion site if only coastal detector locations are 
utilized, resulting in approximately 100 antineutrino detectors. With each detector costing 
400 billion dollars, the total network cost would be approximately 40 trillion dollars, far 
beyond a feasible cost for a detector network (antineutrino or non-antineutrino).  
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Due to the detector size and cost required for antineutrino detection, it is not practical to 
think a large network of detectors would be deployed around the world. For this reason, 
the detectors would need to be placed at strategic locations in an effort to detect illicit 
nuclear explosions, although they would still be more costly and potentially less effective 
than the alternatives (such as an expanded IMS). 
 
 
Use Case #2: Test-Site Transparency 
 
The second use case of interest is the scenario in which an antineutrino detector is deployed 
on a nuclear test-site as part of a test-site transparency agreement. This case alleviates the 
concern of the first use case because only a few detectors are required worldwide and they 
are deployed at known test locations with a specific monitoring objective. In this situation, 
if a 1-kT explosion were to take place, it would need to be detected within the confines of 
the declared nuclear test site. Based on the dimensions of the former Nevada Nuclear Test 
Site, a detection stand-off can be estimated to be on the order of 50 km. One key difference 
is the likelihood that the backgrounds are higher due to the detector being located mid-
continent instead of underwater. The antineutrino backgrounds would increase by 
approximately a factor of 3 (with hot spots in certain areas). While the detection criteria 
would increase depending on increased backgrounds of the location (Currie, 1968), we 
assume that the same detection criteria can be utilized and require a 5-neutrino-event signal 
for detection: 
 
Equation	4:	Calculation	of	the	antineutrino	(?̅?)	flux	at	the	detector	for	test-site	transparency	
Antineutrino	Flux	at	Detector	=	 Antineutrino	(?̅?)	Source(Distance	from	explosion)! = 7.25	 ×	10!!	?̅?(50	km)! = 	2.9 × 10& 		 ?̅?𝑐𝑚! 
 
Equation	5:	Calculation	of	the	antineutrino	interaction	rate	within	the	detector	medium	(water)	based	on	the	number	
of	protons	per	gram	of	water.	Antineutrino	interaction	rate	=	2.9 × 10& 	 ?̅?𝑐𝑚! 	 ∙ 	10"##	cm! ∙ 3.3 × 10!$ 1g = 9.7 × 10"%! ?̅?	eventsg  
 
 
Equation	6:	Calculation	of	the	required	antineutrino	detector	size	for	the	required	event	burst	observed	within	the	
detector	for	test-site	transparency.	
Detector	size	=	 Event	burst	size?̅?	interaction	rate = 5	events9.7 × 10!"% ?̅?	eventsg = 500	kTonnes = 500,000	𝑚$ 
 
 
For reference, this detector would be ~twice the size of Hyper-K, ~200 times the size of 
the Statue of Liberty and cost 1 billion dollars. In the instance of being able to have 
additional technologies available to correlate the events (such as seismic cueing), the 
detection threshold could drop from 5-neutrino-events to 2-neutrino events. In this 
instance, the detector would be dropped to approximately the size of Hyper-K and 400 
million dollars. 
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An alternative scenario would be the implementation of current monitoring technologies 
for test-site transparency, with radioxenon detectors being the most comparable for 
verification of the nuclear nature of an explosion. If we assume that 0.1% of all of the 
radioxenon produced from a 1 kT nuclear explosion was released (estimated from possible 
scenarios (Ringbom, 2014)), then we can calculate the detection threshold for a radioxenon 
detector.  
 
Equation	7:	Calculation	of	the	radioxenon	detector	system	sensitivity	at	a	distance	of	50	km	for	test-site	transparency.	
The	calculation	is	based	on	the	total	amount	of	radioxenon	produced	from	a	1	kT	nuclear	explosion	along	with	an	
assumed	release	fraction	and	an	average	dilution	value	at	50	km.	1	kT	~	10%'	Bq	of	 Xe%$$ 	∙	10"$	release	fraction = 10%!	Bq	of	 Xe%$$ 	 ∙ dilution	of	10%( 	 1𝑚$ = 10! Bqm$ 
 
Based on the current detection threshold of 0.15 mBq/m3 for the Xenon International 
system (LePetit, 2013), a radioxenon detector placed near the antineutrino detector would 
have a detection threshold of ~1.5×10-6 kT. This improved detection threshold suggests 
that a xenon detector would have better sensitivity than an antineutrino detector monitoring 
the same test-site area. Alternatively, this suggests that a radioxenon detector for test-site 
transparency could be sensitive to a release fraction of just 1.5×10-9 of a 1 kT nuclear 
explosion. 
 
Use Case #3: Applications Beyond Detection 
 
Other hypothetical roles for antineutrinos are in providing information about a fission 
explosion’s yield. Antineutrinos are a theoretically attractive approach for estimating 
fission yield, because the total antineutrino emission is basically proportional to fission 
yield. In contrast, the magnitude of seismic signals depends heavily on the depth of an 
underground explosion and other geological factors. However, making an antineutrino-
based estimate of fission yield that is precision competitive with seismic estimates requires 
a stronger signal than confirming the presence of fission. This application would thus 
require detectors larger and more expensive than those depicted in Figure 3, (Carr et al., 
2018). 
 
In theory, a discrepancy between antineutrino-based and seismic-based yield estimates 
could indicate the presence of some fusion yield (if the seismic-based, total-energy yield is 
known to be larger than the antineutrino-based, fission-only yield) or intentional masking 
of the seismic signal by underground cavity engineering (if the seismic signal is 
significantly smaller than the antineutrino signal). The stringent requirements on both the 
antineutrino and seismic signals make this application even less conceivable than 
antineutrino-based yield constraints. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusions  
 
While there are scenarios where antineutrino detectors are capable of monitoring for 
nuclear explosions, these scenarios appear to be limited unless budgets are nearly 
unlimited, or some other extremely special case is identified in which costs can be 
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leveraged by other missions such as basic science. Another important point that one must 
remember when considering the use of antineutrino detectors is the improvements that 
could be obtained by expanding the IMS using current technologies with the cost a fraction 
of the cost that would be needed to deploy a limited number of antineutrino detectors. 
While a fully contained nuclear explosion may evade radionuclide detection of a higher 
density IMS system, the risk of this is much smaller than the cost of incorporating the slight 
potential benefit of an antineutrino network. 
 
To obtain broad detection of nuclear explosions, the size and cost (200 MTonne and 
$400B) is far beyond what is practical. In the instance of test-site transparency, the size 
and cost (500 kTonne and $1B) and the time to build a detector limit the applicability. As 
the fundamental physics detectors continue to grow, there may be instances where they 
could detect a large nuclear explosion, but these instances will be rare and should not be 
considered to be part of routine nuclear explosion monitoring.  
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